Sixteen months from now, South Sudan could face its first national elections. This is a historic moment, and I am sure that the magnitude of the event will attract scrutiny far beyond the country’s borders. From South to North, observers will be watching what the arrangements of the process reveal about South Sudan’s fragile transition from conflict. Yet, expectations remain divided. International observers may label this a test of statehood, but inside the country, the sentiment is more conflicted. For some, elections offer hope for stability. For others, they raise fears of renewed violence disguised as a democratic process.

This is not the first time South Sudan has stood on the edge of electoral promise. The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) initially envisioned elections in 2022 but the vote was postponed due to delays in implementation of its Chapter Two. That same justification was later used to delay elections again in 2024.

What should concern everyone is how these elections risk becoming a vehicle for consolidating power rather than building democracy. Early elections would allow the winning party to sideline minority parties. The goal, it seems, would be more about securing dominance. As Fukuyama warns, when institutions are weak, power is not constrained, and this creates a room for elite capture and corruption. Despite this concern, there are still efforts to hold the vote in 2026.

So, what purpose will these elections actually serve and for whom? Are they meant to restore legitimacy or offer an exit ramp from prolonged transition? The answers are not straightforward. What follows is an attempt to assess readiness, an analysis of who stands to benefit and addressing the question of whether these elections only serve as an entrenchment or if there is an alternative option.

The Fragile Foundations of the 2026 Elections

Democracy requires real competition, which reflects regimes that conduct regular multiparty elections “in which the opposition has some chance of winning and taking office.”). The 2018 R-ARCSS promised elections by 2022, tied to reforms: security overhaul, a permanent constitution, refugee repatriation, census and independent electoral commission. Not one of these conditions was met. Yet, the ruling SPLM pushed forward but money for electoral commission only came through late, and many in the ruling party were not even so keen elections. Nonetheless, the opposition SPLM-IO rejected the plan, forcing a delay to 2024. The cycle repeated. Now 2026 is the new date but the situation has further deteriorated.

With barely sixteen months left, things seem to be getting worse. Dr. Riek Machar, First Vice President and key signatory of the R-ARCSS, is under house arrest, accused of fuelling clashes between government troops and the White Army in Nassir and Ulang. At the time of writing, there have been numerous reports of clashes between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO in Upper Nile since March 2025.

The country is experiencing the consequences of disruption of oil production and exports from early 2024 until April 2025, resulting from the ongoing war in Sudan. The combination of the depreciation of the South Sudan Pound, estimated at 136% between May 2024 and May 2025, and the high inflation have made basic goods unaffordable for the common people. In addition, the National Electoral Commission leadership admits it’s underfunded and critics warn that it is underprepared. It lacks basic infrastructure, equipment, and nationwide reach. The promised census is nowhere near completion and even if it started today, it would not be completed before the election date. Voter data is unreliable, and electoral boundaries are still imaginary lines.

And yet, although everything is dysfunctional, and although there’s no constitution, no credible registry or functioning commission, the vote remains scheduled. Thus, the question is who wants elections and who actually stands to benefit from them?

Who Stands to Gain from a Fragile Process?

Four groups are pushing for the 2026 elections. The first is the international community, especially the TROIKA countries. They backed South Sudan’s independence and poured money into the country’s early institutions. However, corruption scandals such as the infamous list of 75 senior government officials whom President Kiir accused of embezzling $4 billion and the destructive civil war that began in 2013 have reduced their trust in South Sudan’s leaders. Despite the corruption and armed conflicts, TROIKA still insists on elections as a milestone and continues to issue harshly worded statements against every delay. Yet, looking at the current state-of-affairs, 2026 is unlikely to meet their expectations. However, what should be of particular interest here is whether these statements are merely rhetorical support in the donor language or if they are genuinely willing to provide substantive support.

The second group is the civil society organisations. Although with minimal influence over the electoral timeline in the current setting, these groups are pushing very hard for elections and a more inclusive system.

The third group is the South Sudanese public. Most people know the elections won’t be free or fair. But after years of war and suffering, many believe that even flawed elections are better than more bloodshed. Several public perception surveys suggest people are willing to settle for a political off-ramp, not perfection, while some also hope that elections might reduce the size of government. Part of that public frustration stems from how top-heavy and costly the current government has become. South Sudan is weighed down by five vice presidents, 35 ministers, 10 deputy ministers, 550 MPs, 100 Council of States members and a labyrinth of commissions and agencies. For a state that is economically struggling, it is simply unsustainable.

The fourth group is the political elite, comprising two major parties. President Kiir’s SPLM has expressed readiness for elections. While the opposition argues that odds are already stacked in the SPLM’s favour, it is imperative to acknowledge factors that are forcing the SPLM to push for elections.

First, as the ruling party, it feels the full force of the consequences, including sanctions and reduced aid, deployed by the international community as a means to incentivise change. Second, an overwhelming majority of the South Sudanese public views elections as a stabilising factor and is therefore demanding that the vote be held soon. Moreover, the current economic struggles have proven that a bloated, broad-based government is unsustainable. The position of SPLM should therefore be seen as largely responsive.

Conversely, SPLM-IO, a principal party to the agreement, sees no path to a fair contest. With none of the promised reforms from the peace deal implemented and Dr. Machar now under house arrest, this situation lends credence to SPLM-IO’s concerns. While SPLM claims legitimacy and democratic exit from the transition, SPLM-IO sees the vote as a recipe for more violence. Besides SPLM and SPLM-IO interests, many political leaders who are currently not in power are keen, as elections provide an opportunity to displace the incumbents.

Elections or Entrenchment?

For the opposition parties, the feeling is that elections under current conditions offer no advantage. Key reforms remain stalled, and with the SPLM controlling the army and state institutions, the playing field is anything but level. An election now would simply formalise that imbalance. Nonetheless, the SPLM claims the country has achieved sufficient stability and that moving forward with elections ensures democratic continuity. Officials cite recent deployments and administrative steps as signs of readiness. Yet these claims clash with the unresolved reforms and rising tensions. The opposition has every reason to be wary of how electoral legitimacy might later be used against them. This fear by the opposition in post-conflict elections is better explained by Flores and Nooruddin.

Furthermore, it is necessary to acknowledge the personalised nature of South Sudan’s politics where it is difficult to imagine the future of the country’s leadership outside the familiar rivalry between President Kiir and Dr Riek Machar. For this reason, I will base my analysis on two working assumptions: that President Kiir will be the SPLM candidate in 2026, and that Dr Machar, despite his current house arrest, will remain politically relevant. While these assumptions may not hold indefinitely, they reflect how South Sudanese politics continues to revolve around a few dominant figures, with no real alternative power centres in sight.

Within the SPLM government, there is now a position that Dr Machar will be held accountable for “allegedly” being a “peace saboteur.” Under such conditions, critics argue that the ruling party has every incentive to press ahead with elections. Without a strong opposition figure on the ballot, the outcome is predictable, and the result would hand the government a renewed mandate. With that mandate, the winning party could present itself nationally and internationally as re-legitimised.

Compared to the current Transitional Government of National Unity that includes the opposition, a landslide victory for the ruling party could see a far less inclusive government, and hence far less stable, political outlook—a precipitate of further violence or another elite pact.

Elections or Elite Pact? Exploring Another Path

Given the lack of progress since the last extension, it is likely Dr. Riek will oppose the 2026 elections. Yet, history suggests no political settlement lasts without him. Dr. Riek Machar’s tendency to disrupt leadership arrangements through violence, dating back to 1991, risks plunging South Sudan into further chaos and suffering regardless of electoral success. Considering that these disruptions have always been resolved through peace agreements, the vote in 2026, if it proceeds, will likely be followed by yet another unity government, another elite pact dressed as reform.

Should elections be delayed again, the cycle of exclusion of the ordinary South Sudanese will likely continue. Neither path speaks to the needs of ordinary citizens. What concerns me is not whether elections happen, but how little they change.

My final take is that we need to stick to implementing the devil we know that is the R-ARCSS rather than rush into elections. Second, the Tumaini Initiative needs to be revived to include the several hold-out groups under the R-ARCSS framework. As Professor Luka Biong argues, this “has the potential to resuscitate the implementation of the R-ARCSS and garner the much-needed support of the people of South Sudan and the international community.” Third, the extension should be for three years to allow an ample time for full implementation of the security sector and public financial management reforms, repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, conduct of census, review of boundaries, and inclusive voter registration. Lastly, the civil society organisations should play a role of rallying people to exert pressure on the unity government to implement the agreement. The international community and regional bodies like IGAD and the African Union need to strategically use available tools, including leveraging individual country relationships, to mount pressure on the parties.

Arol Dut is a South Sudanese MSc student in Development Policy and Politics at the University of Birmingham, where he is also a research assistant at the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. He is the 2024–2026 Mo Ibrahim Scholar at the University of Birmingham.

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